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ABSTRACT. This study examines the impact of taxes on the 
incentive to work under flat and progressive tax systems. 
Of particular interest are the changes from progressive-
to-flat and flat-to-progressive tax conditions. To measure 
the impact of taxes on the incentive to work under both 
scenarios, we relate hours worked with the effective 
marginal tax rates. Using national accounts data and the 
Prescott’s (2004) labor market model, Slovakian work 
hours were examined at points in time around the 
adoption of a flat tax system in 2004 and a progressive tax 
system in 2013. In Slovakia, there was a transition from a 
progressive to a flat tax system in 2004, followed by a 
reversion back to a progressive tax system in 2013. 
Theoretically, the incentive to work increases when a 
progressive tax structure is replaced with a flat tax, while 
the incentive to work decreases in the opposite case. 
However, the findings show that when Slovakia replaced 
its progressive tax with a flat one, the actual hours worked 
decreased, contrary to predictions. When the flat tax was 
abandoned in favor of a progressive tax structure, hours 
worked also decreased, but less than when the flat tax was 
introduced, and significantly less than predicted by the 
model. 
JEL Classification: H24, 
J22. 
Keywords: flat tax system, progressive tax system, labor-leisure 
preferences, labor market model, Slovakia. 
Introduction 
In many developed countries there have been recent calls for a flatter tax structure, for 
example, in Italy and the United States (Daniel & Martino, 2019; Lyman, 2019; Follain & 
Lorenzo, 2019). Back in the 2016 election for the President in the United States, four of the 
Nadirov, O., Dehning, B., & Pavelkova, D. (2021). Taxes and the incentive to 
work under flat and progressive tax systems in Slovakia. Economics and Sociology, 
14(2), 40-55. doi:10.14254/2071-789X.2021/14-2/2 
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Republican candidates proposed variations of a flat tax (Schoen, 2015). However, changing the 
tax structure assumes high costs, both due to implementation of the new rules by the 
government and then due to compliance of taxpayers. Therefore, such changes should not be 
made without the expectation that the benefits would outweigh the costs. There were several 
countries that adopted, and then abandoned, a flat tax structure, thus providing researchers with 
a natural experiment environment for testing the efforts of taxpayers under flat and progressive 
tax structures, helping us to infer the incentive or the disincentive effects of both. In this paper, 
we examine one such country, Slovakia, that adopted a flat tax in 2004 and switched back to a 
progressive tax structure in 2013. 
Early theories of the flat tax system adoption were proposed by Hall and Rabushka 
(1983, 1985). However, such proportional (i.e., flat) tax systems were implemented in very few 
countries before the 1990s (Paulus & Peichl, 2009; Adhikari & Alm, 2016). After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, flat taxes became a part of the transition economies in the Eastern 
and Central Europe (Easterbrook, 2008), and since 2009 thirty countries in the world adopted 
flat tax systems, with about half of them being in Eastern Europe (Paulus & Peichl, 2009; 
Adhikari & Alm, 2016). The adoption of a flat tax system was expected to boost the economies 
in these countries by influencing labor markets and increasing the gross domestic product 
(Peichl, 2014). However, in such countries as Iceland, Serbia, Ukraine, and Slovakia, the results 
were not as expected, and these countries abolished their flat tax systems in 2010, 2010, 2011, 
and 2013 respectively. Grabowski (2005) and Keen et al. (2008) have extensively reviewed the 
discussion of the flat tax reforms in Eastern Europe. 
The current study attempts to test the relationship between taxes and the incentive to 
work in a natural experiment under two scenarios: 
(i) Switching from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system. 
(ii) Switching from a flat tax system to a progressive tax system. 
Optimal income taxation 
Selecting the proper tax system is a challenge for governmental tax administrators. One 
of the most significant concerns governments face is life cycle productivity shocks that cannot 
be privately insured by households, which subsequently affect their consumption level 
(Heathcote et al., 2017). There is a need for social insurance against these life cycle productivity 
shocks in the labor market, and progressive taxation is considered to be a useful tool against 
them (Heathcote et al., 2017). The impact of progressive taxation on life cycle productivity 
shocks can be explained by keeping a more equal income distribution and welfare among 
households. However, progressive taxation has distortionary effects on the incentive to work 
and saving decisions of households. The central claim in the literature is that the incentive to 
work increases in the case of a change from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system, due 
to the proportional feature of a flat tax system and low rates of taxation (Peichl, 2014). The 
rationale behind this idea is equity concerns and labor supply efficiency. 
 In the optimal taxation literature, Mirrlees (1971) is the seminal contribution to analyze 
the equity-efficiency trade-off. According to Mirrlees (1971), redistribution (i.e., equity 
concerns such as social benefits from equality) causes efficiency losses by causing labor-supply 
distortions through a labor-leisure and a consumption-saving decision and he proposes linearity 
of optimal taxation. On the other hand, Tuomala (1990) argues that the most efficient tax 
structure is non-linear, as redistribution can be achieved with less deadweight loss (i.e., less 
labor-supply and tax distortions) due to having more information on the earnings of households 
(Jacobs et al., 2010). Theoretically, the differences originate from which utility function is 
employed. Welfare gains can be achieved if the utilitarian planner makes a policy towards a flat 
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tax (Conesa & Krueger, 2006). The utilitarian social welfare function refers to the Cobb-
Douglas preferences in consumption and leisure (Jacobs et al., 2010). However, employing a 
Rawlsian welfare function instead of a utilitarian function can favor progressive taxation, 
because it concentrates on households at the bottom of the distribution or features high 
inequality aversion by taking into account redistribution from high ability to low ability agents 
(Conesa & Krueger, 2006). 
Laboratory experiments, simulation, and labor market models 
There are a few studies that employ laboratory experiments to test the effect of 
progressive tax systems on the incentive to work. For example, employing a real-effort task in 
a laboratory experiment, Sillamaa (1999) found that the incentive to work is higher under a flat 
tax system, and flattening the tax structure generated a significant increase in tax revenues. 
Similarly, Gamage et al. (2010) showed a considerably higher incentive to work in a flat tax 
system. However, Pa´ntya et al. (2016) found the opposite results, that the incentive to work 
increases when the change is from a flat tax system to a progressive tax system. Their findings 
support the real-effort experiments conducted by Fochmann and Weimann (2013), who showed 
the positive effect of direct and indirect progressive tax systems on the incentive to work. As 
shown, previous empirical findings are mixed on this topic. Moreover, the evidence from the 
experiments is not comparable because they do not hold total taxes and average tax rates 
constant. Despite having dissimilarities in the methodological approaches between this study 
and Pa´ntya et al. (2016), it is interesting to test their idea with a real-world tax system in a 
country that actually adopted a flat tax system in 2004 and then switched back to a progressive 
tax system in 2013. We use the labor market model developed by Prescott (2004) to examine 
the aforementioned scenarios in Slovakia due to tax reforms in both scenarios. 
The current study is consistent with two groups of studies demonstrating simulations of 
hypothetical flat taxes. The first set of studies of hypothetical flat tax systems correspond to 
simulation models that measure the potential effects of flat tax systems in Western countries 
that never adopted flat tax systems (e.g., Ventura, 1999; Aaberge et al., 2000; Caminada and 
Goudswaard, 2001; Fuest et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2010). On the other hand, Prescott's and 
Rogerson's studies refer to the labor market models that examine the effect of marginal tax rates 
on labor income in major advanced industrial countries (e.g., Prescott, 2004; Rogerson, 2006, 
2007, 2008; Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009). Most studies on hypothetical flat tax reforms 
found that a flat tax system increases the incentive to work (Easterbrook, 2008; Paulus and 
Peichl, 2009). It is generally accepted that lower marginal tax rates increase the incentive to 
work due to the substitution from leisure to work (Prescott, 2004; Nadirov et al., 2017, 2020; 
Nadirov and Dehning, 2020), and higher taxes are perceived as a loss of individual freedom 
(Kirchler, 1997; Kirchler, 1999; Kirchler, 2007) by the extent to which individuals consider the 
power of, and trust in, tax authorities (Kirchler et al., 2008; Mas' ud et al., 2019). Dalton (2015) 
and Conesa and Kehoe (2017) also found a negative effect of taxes on aggregate hours worked 
per working-age person in Austria and Spain, respectively. This study differs from studies using 
simulation models by using actual changes between progressive and flat tax systems.  
Objective 
The current study contributes to the existing literature by addressing issues related to 
the effect of labor taxes on the incentive to work in real tax designs, including both flat and 
progressive tax systems. We relate hours worked in Slovakia with labor tax rates developed by 
Prescott (2004) and Mocan and Pogorelova (2015). In doing so, we obtain robust results for our 
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predictions. Our findings imply that the incentive to work decreases in the case of a change 
from a flat tax system to a progressive tax system, but are inconclusive in the case of a change 
from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system. Overall, if decreases in the incentive to work 
can be attributed to the estimated effect of the flat-to-progressive condition, then the 
implementation of progressive tax systems in those countries should be re-evaluated from a 
labor market perspective by tax administrators and policymakers.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, the model is developed. 
In Section 2, we describe the methods used to estimate tax rates. Section 3 presents a 
comparison of the actual and predicted number of hours worked. Section 4 discusses the model 
predictions when holding the consumption-income ratio constant. Section 5 the goodness of fit, 
6 the results, and section 7 analyzes the sensitivity of the results. Finally, in the last section, we 
conclude the paper. 
1. Labor market model 
The following labor market model is the one developed by Prescott (2004) to explain 
the tradeoff between work and leisure. He specified the utility of an infinitely-lived 
representative agent as 
 ∑∞𝑡=0 𝛽
𝑡(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑡  − 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 100 − ℎ𝑡))  (1.1) 
Where 𝑐𝑡 shows consumption and ℎ𝑡represents weekly hours worked in the market in 
the time period 𝑡. The discount factor 𝛽 stands for the degree of patience, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, and 
100 − ℎ𝑡measures non-market productive time (leisure). The 𝛼parameter is the positive 
constant that shows the value connected to leisure. 
As this study is concerned with hours-worked in the year after tax reform, a single-
period Prescott model developed by Easterbrook (2008) is used. As in Easterbrook (2008), the 
time period, t, is equal to zero, so the utility function is represented by 
 𝑢(𝑐, ℎ) = (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐 − 𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 100 − ℎ)) (1.2) 
The individual is subject to a budget constraint 
 (1 + 𝜏𝑐)𝑐 ≤ (1 − 𝜏ℎ)𝑤ℎ + 𝑏 (1.3) 
Taxes on consumption and labor are denoted by 𝜏𝑐 and 𝜏ℎ respectively. 𝑤 denotes the 
real wage rate and 𝑏 represents non-labor income. Utility maximization with regards to 
consumption and labor is depicted below 
 𝑢𝑐 = 𝜆(1 + 𝜏𝑐) (1.4) 
And 
 𝑢ℎ = −𝜆(1 − 𝜏ℎ)𝑤 (1.5) 
The ratio of equation (1.4) and (1.5) shows the marginal rate of substitution between 








The labor and consumption tax rates can be captured by the effective marginal tax rate 







= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 (1.7) 
In the aforementioned equation, the fraction of (1 − 𝜏ℎ)/(1 + 𝜏𝑐) denotes the tax 
wedge (Ohanian, et al. 2008, OECD 2019). Setting (1 − 𝜏) = (1 − 𝜏ℎ)/(1 + 𝜏𝑐), the 
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To build the key equilibrium relation, first, a derivation of equation (1.2), and then the 












= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 (1.10) 
The aggregate output in a dynamic economy is a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with capital cost share 𝜃, where 0 < 𝜃 < 1, and labor cost share (1 − 𝜃). 
 𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘𝜃ℎ−𝜃 (1.11) 
where k is capital, and h is the labor supply. Based on equation (1.11), the marginal 
product of labor was calculated 




Using (1 − 𝜃)
𝑦
ℎ









Equation (1.13) is the key equilibrium to test the effect of flat and progressive taxes on 
the incentive to work, controlling for the consumption-income ratio (c/y ratio).  
2. Estimating tax rates 
Consumption and labor tax rates presented in this paper are calculated based on two 
different methodologies. These two approaches, the Prescott (2004) approach and the Mocan 
and Pogorelova (2015) approach, are presented in the following two sections.  
2.1 Prescott approach 
 As Silva (2008) provides, taxes in the model should be related to the consumption and 
labor taxes in the actual economies. The following estimation for Slovakia closely follows the 
methodology of Prescott. However, it should be noted that Prescott's method for estimating tax 
rates is based on Mendoza et al. (1994) but with some significant differences. 
 Prescott (2004) follows the Feenberg and Coutts (1993) estimate of the marginal tax 
rate on labor income. Feenberg and Coutts (1993) use a representative sample of tax records to 
show how much tax revenue increases if every worker had an increase in their labor income of 





 Where 𝜏𝑠𝑠 shows the marginal social security tax rate, ?̄?𝑖𝑛𝑐denotes the average income 
tax rate, and𝜏𝑐the consumption tax rate.  
 Setting the Feenberg-Coutts parameter, f, to 1.6, as per Prescott (2004), to reflect the 
fact that the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate results in the marginal income tax 





Table 1 contains estimated tax rates using the Prescott approach, with data from the 
Eurostat database (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) in Slovakia for the period from 2000 to 2016. National 
Accounts data on tax aggregates, GDP and its main components, and general government 
expenditures are only available for Slovakia after 2000 to measure effective marginal tax rates 
in Slovakia,  
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2.2. Mocan and Pogorelova approach 
Mocan and Pogorelova (2015) estimated consumption and labor taxes based on the 
methodology of Prescott, but with McDaniel’s (2014) social security tax rates,𝜏𝑠𝑠, and average 
tax rates on household income, ?̄?𝑖𝑛𝑐. Table 1 contains estimated tax rates using the Mocan and 
Pogorelova approach, with data from McDaniel (2014). McDaniel (2014) estimated tax rates 
for Slovakia from 2000 to 2015. 
Table 1. Actual average hours worked and the effective marginal tax rate (in percent) in 
Slovakia 2000-2016   
Year Actual Hours Prescott M&P 
2000 20.17 54.9 41.8 
2001 20.04 53.1 41.3 
2002 19.88 53.0 42.2 
2003 20.28 53.0 42.2 
2004 20.00 51.1 41.1 
2005 20.52 50.7 40.4 
2006 20.61 47.6 37.9 
2007 21.10 47.5 38.2 
2008 21.40 47.0 37.4 
2009 20.34 45.9 36.9 
2010 19.94 45.2 37.0 
2011 20.07 46.2 38.1 
2012 20.14 45.7 38.2 
2013 20.11 48.9 40.1 
2014 20.08 50.5 40.8 
2015 20.54 52.4 41.5 
2016 21.10 52.6 -- 
Source: Authors own elaboration to measure effective marginal tax rates using data from 
Eurostat (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) and McDaniel (2014). Actual hours data is from the ILOSTAT 
(2019) database. 
3. Actual and predicted hours worked 
Using the same approach as Prescott (2004), actual average hours worked per person in 
the population are constructed by multiplying mean weekly hours actually worked per 
employed person by the employment-to-population ratio (ILOSTAT 2019). According to 
ILOSTAT (2019), working-age people refers to all individuals who are older than 15 years. 
Equation (1.13) is used to forecast the number of hours worked. There are two main parameters 
that need to be specified in equation (1.13) that are taken from Prescott (2014), the capital share 
parameter (𝜃 = 0.3224) and the leisure parameter (𝛼 = 1.54). Comparing actual hours worked 
to predicted hours will show whether the labor market model overestimates or underestimates 
the number of hours worked. As shown in Table 2, the predicted hours worked for Slovakia are 
below the actual hours worked by 0.29 to 2.40 hours. The labor market model utilized provides 
a better fit when compared to predictions from the Prescott (2004) and Hallam and Weber 
(2008) models. The average absolute errors in Table 2 range from 0.29 to 2.40 hours, while in 
Prescott (2004) the average absolute errors are -1.9 to 9.1 hours and in Hallam and Weber 
(2008) the average absolute errors are 4.1 to 6.1 hours. As shown in Table 2, predicted hours 
worked and actual hours worked move in the opposite direction between 2003 and 2004 and in 
the same direction between 2012 and 2013. Switching from a progressive tax system to a flat 
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tax system (between 2003 and 2004), the Slovakian tax rate decreased from 53.0% to 51.1%, 
leading to an increase in predicted hours worked from 17.88 to 18.76. However, there was a 
decrease in actual hours worked from 20.28 to 20.00. Switching from flat tax rates to 
progressive tax rates (from 2012 to 2013), tax rates increased from 45.7 percent to 48.9 percent, 
leading to a decline in predicted hours worked from 19.85 to 18.90. Actual hours worked also 
decreased slightly, from 20.14 to 20.11. 
 
Table 2. Actual and predicted labor supply for Slovakia 




















2003 20.28 53.0 17.88 2.40 42.2 21.11 0.83 
2004 20.00 51.1 18.76 1.24 41.1 21.75 1.75 
2012 20.14 45.7 19.85 0.29 38.2 21.98 1.84 
2013 20.11 48.9 18.90 1.21 40.1 21.45 1.34 
1 “Prescott” indicates the Prescott approach; “M&P” indicates the Mocan and Pogorelova 
approach. 
2 2003 Year Prior to Flat Tax; 2004 1st Year of Flat Tax; 2012 Year Prior to Progressive Tax; 
2013 1st Year of Progressive Tax 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
As shown in Table 2, the prediction for hours worked using the Mocan and Pogorelova 
approach for Slovakia are above the actual hours worked by about 0.83 to 1.84 hours. The labor 
market model utilized again provides a better fit compared to the predictions made by Prescott 
(2004), and Hallam and Weber (2008). In Table 2, predicted hours worked and actual hours 
worked move in the opposite direction between 2003 and 2004 and in the same direction 
between 2012 and 2013. Switching from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system (from 
2003 to 2004), the Slovakian tax rate decreased from 42.2 percent to 41.1 percent, leading to 
an increase in predicted hours worked from 21.11 to 21.75, compared to a decrease in actual 
hours worked from 20.28 to 20.00. Switching from flat tax rates to progressive tax rates (from 
2012 to 2013), tax rates increased from 38.2 percent to 40.1 percent, leading to a decline in 
predicted hours from 21.98 to 21.45. As shown previously, actual hours worked also decreased 
slightly, from 20.14 to 20.11. 
4. Consumption-Income ratio  
To isolate the effect of taxes on hours worked, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) hold the 
consumption-income ratio (c/y ratio) constant. In the current analysis, the same approach is 
followed. The c/y ratios are shown in Table 3. Using the effective marginal tax rates calculated 
using the Prescott approach, Table 3 compares the predicted hours worked for Slovakia, using 
the actual c/y ratio in each period and while holding the c/y ratio constant at the level of the 
preceding period. Switching from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system (from 2003 to 
2004), predicted hours worked increased by 3.28% if the c/y ratio had not changed from 2003 
to 2004. Switching from a flat tax system to a progressive tax system (between 2012 and 2013), 
predicted hours worked decreased by 5.20% if the c/y ratio had not changed from 2012 to 2013. 
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Table 3. Decomposition of predicted hours worked  
         Prescott 1 M&P 
Year 2 
Period of 
c/y ratio c/y Ratio 
Predicted 
(hours) 
 (h) % Change 
Predicted 
(hours) 
 (h) % Change 
2003 2003 c/y ratio 0.95 17.88    21.11       
2004 2004 c/y ratio 0.93 18.76 4.92 21.75 3.03 
2004 2003 c/y ratio 0.95 18.47 3.28 21.43 1.53 
2012 2012 c/y ratio 0.97 19.85    21.98    
2013 2013 c/y ratio 0.97 18.90 -4.79 21.45 -2.41 
2013 2012 c/y ratio 0.97 18.82 -5.20 21.37 -2.79 
1 “Prescott” indicates the Prescott approach; “M&P” indicates the Mocan and Pogorelova 
approach. 
2 2003 Year Prior to Flat Tax; 2004 1st Year of Flat Tax; 2012 Year Prior to Progressive Tax; 
2013 1st Year of Progressive Tax 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
   
Using the effective marginal tax rates derived using the Mocan and Pogorelova 
approach, Table 3 shows the predicted hours worked for Slovakia, first using the actual c/y ratio 
for the period and then the c/y ratio at the level of the preceding period. The c/y ratios are shown 
in Table 3. Switching from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system (between 2003 and 
2004), predicted hours worked increased by 3.03%, but they would have increased by 1.53% if 
the c/y ratio had been constant. Switching from a flat tax system to a progressive tax system 
(between 2012 and 2013), predicted hours worked decreased by 2.41%, but they would have 
decreased by 2.79% if the c/y ratio had been constant. 
5. Goodness of fit 
Two criteria are used to assess the goodness of fit: (1) the difference between actual and 
predicted hours worked, and (2) the trend between actual and predicted hours worked. In Figure 
1, the solid line indicates the actual hours worked, and the dashed lines show the predicted 
hours worked based on the marginal tax rates on labor income calculated using the Prescott 
approach and the Mocan and Pogorelova approach. Also shown in Figure 1 are the two tax 
structure changes in Slovakia, the progressive-to-flat and flat-to-progressive tax conditions. 
These are indicated in Figure 1 by the blue and red vertical lines. Figure 1 shows that the model 
based on Prescott’s approach to calculating tax rates underestimates the predicted labor supply 
for all years. The model based on tax rates calculated using the Mocan and Pogorelova approach 
overestimates the labor supply for all years except the year 2000. As shown in Figure 1, both 
actual and predicted hours worked were generally increasing from 2000 to 2008. The decrease 
in hours worked that began in 2008 can be explained by the financial crisis that also began in 
2008. 
In the short run (e.g., the period from 2004 to 2005), the model predictions move in 
opposite directions, as the actual value moves up the predicted hours move down. We should 
note that individuals are responsive to the progressive-to-flat tax condition over the five years 
that incentive to work increased, as observed in the period 2004-2008. In the flat-to-progressive 
tax condition, while the model based on Prescott taxes shows almost the same trend in line with 
the actual values, the model based on Mocan and Pogorelova taxes shows only the one part of 
the story due to the missing value in 2016. The individuals are responsive to the flat-to-
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progressive tax condition in the short-run (e.g., the period from 2013 to 2014), as the model 
predictions move in the same line with the actual value. However, in the long run, the trend for 
actual and predicted hours, as observed in the period 2013-2016, is in the upward motion. 
 
   
Figure 1. Labor Supply in Slovakia 
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
5. Results 
As shown previously in Table 2, the effective marginal tax rate on labor income 
decreased from 2003 to 2004 when Slovakia changed from a progressive to flat tax structure, 
and increased from 2012 to 2013 when Slovakia changed from a flat to a progressive tax 
structure. Holding everything else constant, this should have given workers the incentive to 
work more in 2004 and less in 2013. However, as shown in Table 4, when the tax structure in 
Slovakia changed from progressive tax rates to flat tax rates, actual hours worked decreased by 
0.28 hours per week per working-aged person in the population. However, the predicted hours 
worked, holding everything constant except the change in the structure of the tax rates increased 
by 0.88 hours (Prescott approach) and 0.64 hours (Mocan and Pogorelova approach). Because 
the predicted hours worked accounts for the change in the effective marginal tax rate and holds 
the c/y ratio constant, the difference between the actual and predicted tax rates can be attributed 
to the change in the structure of the tax rates. 
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Table 4. Comparison of the change in actual and predicted hours worked 





2003-2004 -0.28 0.88 0.64 
2012-2013 -0.03 -0.95 -0.53 
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
* (P) indicates the Prescott approach to estimating the effective marginal tax rate on labor 
income and (M&P) indicates the Mocan and Pogorelova approach to estimating the effective 
marginal tax rate on labor income  
5. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed by choosing different values for the parameters in the 
labor market model and then calculating predicted hours. Table 5 contains the output from the 
labor market model when alternative inputs are chosen for the key parameters. The benchmark 
model was based on the parameters of 𝛼 = 1.54, 𝜃 = 0.32, and 𝑓 = 1.6. For choosing 
alternative values of 𝜃 and𝑓, we refer to Silva (2008). Silva (2008) chose two different values 
for 𝜃, 0.30 and 0.35, and two different values for 𝑓, 1.4 and 1.8. However, the value attached 
to leisure (𝛼) is not related to any direct assumption. Following Silva (2008), the parameters 
are the same as previous research (Prescott, 2004). It should be noted that 𝛼it is one of the 
critical parameters in the labor market model because 𝛼it can have substantial differences 
between countries. However, the parameter 𝛼 needs to be kept constant to isolate the changes 
in the incentive to work caused solely by taxes (Silva, 2008). 
 In the benchmark prediction, we followed Prescott (2004) and set 𝛼 = 1.54. In addition 
to the benchmark prediction, two different values for 𝛼 were tested, 𝛼 = 0.54 and 𝛼 = 1.00. 
Recall that the parameter 𝛼 is positive, and aversion to work is positively correlated with 𝛼. 
Increasing 𝛼 increases the aversion to work, and lower values of 𝛼 mean that individuals are 
less work averse. 
 In some cultures, the preference for leisure is considered high when the residents of that 
country engage less in labor activity (Glaeser et al., 2003; Blanchard, 2006; Alesina et al., 
2005). However, it is hard to disentangle the effect of wages from the effect of taxes. Building 
their theories based on cultural attitude studies (Fernández et al., 2004; Fernández and Fogli, 
2009; Fernández, 2011), recent scholarly literature finds the effect of culture of leisure on the 
labor supply by controlling per capita income (see Mocan and Pogorelova, 2015; Moriconi and 
Peri, 2019). 
 The predicted hours are closest to actual hours when 𝛼 = 1.54, as in the benchmark 
model. For example, the predicted hours for Slovakia in 2003 slightly improve when we keep 
the parameters for 𝑓 = 1.4 and 𝜃 = 0.3 as the difference from the actual values is around 1.39 
hours. A similar pattern is observed in 2004 when we keep the parameters for 𝑓 = 1.4 and 𝜃 =
0.3 as the difference is around 0.27 hours. For Slovakia in 2012, this difference is reduced to 
0.11 hour when the parameters are set to 𝑓 = 1.4 and 𝜃 = 0.32. In 2013, the difference is 
around 0.25 hours when we maintain the parameters for 𝑓 = 1.4 and 𝜃 = 0.3. To put it 
differently, predictions from the labor market model are more sensitive to the value attached to 
leisure (𝛼) than the values of 𝜃 and𝑓. Moreover, it should be noted that predictions from the 
labor market model are less sensitive to the values of 𝜃 and𝑓, which is similar to the findings 
of Silva (2008). 
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Table 5. Predictions from the labor market model when choosing different parameter values 
    Predicted Hours 
                  α=0.54             
         θ=0.30       θ=0.32       θ=0.35    
Year 
Actual 
Hours f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 
2003 20.28 39.90 39.08 38.23 39.13 38.31 37.47 38.14 37.33 36.50 
2004 20.00 41.21 40.49 39.74 40.43 39.70 38.97 39.43 38.71 37.98 
2012 20.14 42.79 42.18 41.56 41.99 41.39 40.77 40.99 40.38 39.77 
2013 20.11 41.41 40.71 40.00 40.62 39.93 39.22 39.62 38.94 38.23 
                                
                 α=1.00             
        θ=0.30       θ=0.32       θ=0.35    
Year 
Actual 
Hours f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 
2003 20.28 26.39 25.73 25.05 25.77 25.11 24.44 24.98 24.34 23.68 
2004 20.00 27.46 26.87 26.26 26.82 26.23 25.64 26.01 25.43 24.85 
2012 20.14 28.77 28.26 27.75 28.11 27.61 27.10 27.27 26.78 26.29 
2013 20.11 27.62 27.05 26.47 26.98 26.41 25.84 26.17 25.61 25.05 
                                
                 α=1.54             
        θ=0.30       θ=0.32       θ=0.35    
Year 
Actual 
Hours f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 f=1.4 f=1.6 f=1.8 
2003 20.28 18.89 18.36 17.83 18.39 17.88 13.36 17.78 17.28 16.77 
2004 20.00 19.73 19.26 18.78 19.28 18.76 18.34 18.58 18.13 17.68 
2012 20.14 20.78 20.37 19.96 20.25 19.85 19.44 19.58 19.19 18.80 
2013 20.11 19.86 19.41 18.95 19.35 18.90 18.45 18.71 18.27 17.83 
                      
Source: Authors' own elaboration. 
Conclusion 
The present study builds on the significant findings of Prescott (2004) by predicting the 
effect of taxes on the incentive to work in flat and progressive tax systems for Slovakia. The 
results do not confirm the prior literature that demonstrates that progressive tax rates negatively 
affect the incentive to work. As shown previously in Table 4, actual hours worked declined 
when a flat tax was adopted, despite the theoretical predictions that the number of hours worked 
should increase. When Slovakia abandoned the flat tax and returned to a progressive tax 
structure, theoretically there should have been a dramatic decline in the number of hours 
worked. However, there was almost no change in the actual hours worked. These results suggest 
that, in the context of Slovakia, the incentive to work decreases more when the change is from 
a progressive tax system to a flat tax system. Therefore, it is not recommended to change the 
current tax policy in Slovakia as the progressive tax system has fewer labor-supply distortions. 
But this is not the entire story. In addition, as shown in Table 5, sensitivity analysis supplies a 
magnitude for the effects of the culture of leisure preferences on the incentive to work in 
Slovakia. Focusing on the values attached to leisure preferences, we take two different 
parameters (α) of leisure for predicting hours worked, respectively α=0.54 (less work averse) 
and α=1.00 (high work averse). We found that the labor supply decisions of the taxpayers 
depend mainly on not only from the degree of the progressivity of taxes, but also the utility that 
they get from leisure. Rather than responding immediately to taxes in flat and progressive tax 
systems, taxpayers may also take into consideration the utility of leisure and how much they 
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value their free time. Using the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey 
(ESS), recent scholarly works find that cultural values of leisure preferences are a significant 
factor in the employment rates of individuals of European countries (Moriconi and Peri, 2019) 
and labor supplied by women (Giavazzi et al., 2009).   
Nevertheless, the present study has limitations. First, the Prescott model has been 
criticized by many scholars due to the omission of other significant institutional factors (Alesina 
et al., 2005; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2008). Second, in happiness research, Oishi et al. (2012) 
found that, on average, residents living in countries with more progressive tax structures are 
happier than residents living in countries with less progressive tax structures. Moreover, Oishi 
et al. (2018) found that poor residents in the United States are happier because of the 
progressivity of taxation, as it is characterized by less income inequality. They claim that 
reversing the progressive tax system to less progressive taxation may increase income 
inequality and can decrease the happiness of the poor residents of the United States. Akay et al. 
(2012) found the same results for the residents of Germany. This view was also mentioned for 
the Slovakian economy by Lenartova (2003), that introducing a flat tax system in Slovakia can 
benefit wealthy taxpayers more than poor taxpayers. We do not test the effect of the flat tax 
structure on different income categories, as stratified hours worked data is not available for 
Slovakia during this time period. Because poor workers were exempt from taxes, the flat tax 
did not change their taxable income when compared to the progressive tax system. Our findings 
are an aggregate measure of the labor supply of a heterogeneous population. Therefore, they 
cannot be compared to the happiness research, as we do not classify the individuals as a poor 
or rich due to the limitations of the national accounts data. The current study could be improved 
by including omitted significant institutional demographic factors. However, even in the 
absence of the institutional and demographic factors, it was possible to disentangle and identify 
the impact of tax progressivity and the culture of leisure on the incentive to work. Findings 
were also presented that suggest the preferences for leisure is likely increasing substantially 
over time in Slovakia. If this assumption holds, then we can assume that regardless of whether 
taxes are progressive or flat, taxpayers will work less in Slovakia when the preference for leisure 
is stronger. Therefore, we can conclude that leisure preferences cannot be treated as a constant 
term, which is emphasized in previous economic models (Giavazzi et al., 2009, Guan et al., 
2018), and these substantial changes in the preference for leisure can stem from the changes in 
the level of economic development. As Bozkurt and Yesilada (2017) stated, there is a close 
association between economic development and cultural values, including attitudes towards 
leisure. They provide that individuals of the late capitalism place more emphasis on leisure and 
self-expression values, and this raised the importance of the leisure-oriented consumer culture.  
 Despite the limitations of the current study, it offers significant implications for future 
tax policies. To build a more complete labor tax model, future directions should examine other 
factors that affect the incentive to work. An interesting view of predicting the effect of taxes on 
the incentive to work in flat and progressive tax systems is that an association between these 
two variables can be not only connected to economic measures, but also a culture of leisure 
(Mocan and Pogorelova, 2015; Moriconi and Peri, 2019). Therefore, the main challenge for 
policymakers of these countries lies not only in the design of fiscal policies (taxes and 
government spending), but also searching for the cultural insights of those policies, such as 
evaluating the effectiveness of these policies through the individual preferences for a work-
leisure trade-off in the country of origin. For instance, we suggest that future studies could focus 
on comparing the motivation to work between natives and immigrants in Slovakia in both tax 
systems and compare their preferences for leisure. These types of epidemiological approaches 
can explain the different leisure preferences between individuals from different countries of 
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origin. As per Grenčíková and Španková (2016), the approximate data for measuring this trend 
in the labor market can be collected from health insurance companies. 
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